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Abstract 
From the literature, we know that young children engage in inquiry as an organized activity aimed either at confirming or 
refuting the relevance of certain ideas. The current study provides a characterization of changes in inquiry using a multiple 
case study of four 5-year old children. Three computer-based tasks were presented to the children as multivariable problem 
solving situations concerning moving objects. A description of the temporal unfolding of real-time action on a short-term 
time scale and long-term time scale of learning and development is provided. The results indicated that the development of 
inquiry did not follow linear growth but included advances and relapses, exploratory states and transitions. The data were 
compatible with the view that the child's thinking and acting form a complex dynamic system. 
Keywords: inquiry, dynamic system theory, problem-solving, children, variability. 
 
Introduction 
Imagine a 5-year-old boy playing with toy cars using a 
wooden plank as a ramp. He lets his cars roll down while 
imagining an exciting race. He uses different kinds of toy 
cars, some of them heavier, some of them lighter. He sets 
different angles and distances for his ramp and discovers 
how far his cars go. He plays around with the physical 
properties of the objects and might reason about the relations 
between them. This boy – as most other children his age – is 
probably able to formulate hypotheses, propose causes and 
their effects on complex physical phenomena. In this paper, 
we address the scientific thinking of young children and aim 
to characterize the development of inquiry functioning on 
the short-term time scale of the activity and the long-term 
time scale of learning and development, using a micro- 
genetic design with a multivariable problem solving task 
concerning moving objects.  
Children's scientific reasoning has been a productive area 
of study for psychologists and educators (Zimmerman, 
2007). In fact, many studies have proven that preschool 
children already use scientific reasoning in problem-solving 
tasks (e.g., Piekny & Maehler, 2013; Puche-Navarro, Colin- 
vaux, & Dibar, 2001; Wilkening & Sodian, 2005). Scientific 
reasoning involves the use of scientific principles when 
problem solving (Zimmerman, 2007). This kind of thinking 
demands that children generate, evaluate and revise theories, 
and if the skills are highly developed, that they are aware of 
the change of knowledge (Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, & 
Franklin, 2006; Metz, 2011; Zimmerman, 2007).  
In this context, inquiry is defined as a set of cognitive 
processes for understanding phenomena, based on evidence, 
variable incidence and causal relationships. Inquiry allows 
the children to identify causal and non-causal relations 
within a system, to understand evidence and to recognize 
patterns within the evidence when interacting with the  
system (Kuhn, Pease, Iordanou & Wirkala, 2009). It can also 
lead to the coordination of multiple variables and the com-




prehension of the nature of the probabilities that constrain 
the system´s interactions. Children may use inquiry to pro-
pose hypotheses, suggest causes and effects, and coordinate 
theory-evidence and control variables (Kuhn, 2010; Kuhn & 
Pease, 2008). This is especially relevant in a problem- 
solving context, because such a context implies reaching a 
goal when faced with a situation with unknown elements 
(Jonassen, 1997). In this sense, inquiry implies an organized 
activity to answer a question posed by a problem situation 
through the coordination of multiple variables, generation of 
predictions, and reaching justified conclusions even on a 
rudimentary level (Kuhn & Pease, 2008; Kuhn, Pease, 
Iordanou & Wirkala, 2009).  
The framework of complex dynamic systems offers a ge- 
neral theory for the study of developmental processes, which 
is also applicable to the development of a child's inquiry in a 
concrete problem solving context, and the development of 
the child's scientific thinking over the course of months or 
years. Based on a review of the literature, van Geert (2008) 
defined a complex dynamic system as any collection of 
components – such as various internal mental activities – 
that interact with one another and that change each other's 
properties as a result of that interaction. Complex dynamic 
systems are likely to have a number of properties, such as 
self-organization, the emergence of attractor states, soft 
assembly, differentiation into mutually interacting time 
scales, and discontinuous change (see Smith & Thelen, 1993; 
van Geert, 1991, 2008). Using the example above of the 
child with toy cars on a plank, a particular problem – “how 
can I get the car to arrive at a particular place” – is solved in 
a more or less systematic way, making particular choices 
about the information to use, doing particular things that 
reflect some sort of logic or systematic pattern.  
A typical non-dynamic (or static) explanation of the 
child's problem solving would be that the child possesses an 
internal model of the problem at hand, for instance a mental 
model of the relationship between the speed of an object and 
the angle of the ramp it is rolling off, and that there is an 
internal computational process determining the most likely 
angle of the ramp. This then acts as an internal instruction to 
the child's motor system to position the ramp at the intended 
angle. If the result is not as expected, for instance the car 
does not reach the intended location, the child is likely to 
change his or her internal model or to redo the internal 
computation with different internal parameters, leading to 
another action. This is what Barsalou, Breazeal, and Smith 
(2007) called the ‘sense-think-act model’, with cognition 
referring to the ‘think’ part (see also Bickhard, 2009; 2012 
for criticism).  
In a complex dynamic systems approach, the child's  
positioning of the ramp is not the result of internal instruc-
tion based on internal computation combining external in-
formation with an internal mental model, but is an activity 
that emerges on the spot as a result of a multitude of local 
interactions between elements such as perceptions, actions 
in a particular context, memory trace activations, social 
referencing, and transient emotions, all without the necessity 
of an internal model of the task. In fact, knowledge is  
constructed on the time scale of an actual perception-action 
process including all that goes on in the form of covert, 
internal processes, and on the basis of processes such as 
perception, emotion, social cues, and the action affordances 
of the objects present. This construction process, which 
takes place on the short-term time scale of the real-time 
activity, is also referred to as a process of ‘soft assembly’ 
(Kloos & van Orden, 2009), in that it creates patterns that are 
both stable and flexible, that can be repeated and meanwhile 
undergo long-term development. Soft assembly means that 
understanding in scientific reasoning is something that it is 
not ‘inside the mind’ of the child, but that is a product of the 
interaction of the child´s knowledge with the settings and 
constraints of the task that he or she is actively trying to 
solve (Kloos & van Orden, 2009).   
Children’s performance often shows a lot of intra-     
individual variability, in the sense that it fluctuates across 
measurement occasions. Though variability can exist at all 
time scales, the term is most often used for fluctuations on a 
relatively short time frame (Van Dijk & van Geert, 2015). 
The most common interpretation of this type of variability is 
that it is caused by changes in context and/or measurement 
error. For instance, the variations in performance of a child 
who is working on a problem-solving task may be caused in 
changes in alertness, distractibility, and motivation. The core 
assumption is thus that variability is externally ‘added’ to an 
underlying psychological process. However, according to 
the complex dynamic systems framework, variability should 
be seen as an intrinsic property of performance and     
development (Thelen & Smith, 1994; van Geert; 1994). The 
individual is not a passive recipient of changes in the context, 
but an agent who creates his own variability. From this point 
of view, intra-individual variability can be a driving force of 
development and a precursor of a new behavioral repertoire 
(Thelen, 1985).  
This theoretical position was also applied to the domain of 
cognitive development in childhood by Siegler (1996, 2006), 
who argued that variability is one of the core mechanisms 
that causes the evolution of new strategies in children’s pro- 
blem solving behavior. Intra-individual variability is the ex- 
pression of an increased degree of exploration, which offers 
the possibility for differential reinforcement of successful 
strategies (many examples are reviewed in Siegler, 2006). 
Although an unlimited number of different patterns of var-
iability can exist, three typical patterns have been distin-
guished in the literature (Van Dijk & van Geert, 2015). 
These patterns are a global decrease of variability, a global 
increase of variability, or a cyclical pattern (or peak pattern).  
The plausibility of the complex dynamic systems      
approach for the study of cognitive problem-solving in an 
activity context has been shown for a variety of problem 
contexts (examples are Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Mercer, 
2011; Schöner & Thelen, 2006; Smith, 2005; Smith & 
Thelen, 1993; Son, Smith, & Goldstone, 2011; Steenbeek, 




Jansen, & van Geert, 2012; Street, James, Jones, & Smith, 
2011). In the present study, we sought to investigate whether 
inquiry processes have a number of properties that are 
characteristic of complex dynamic systems. We expect to 
find non-linear growth patterns and patterns of intra-   
individual variability. Also, inquiry is very context sensitive 
since it involves an interaction of the child’s knowledge and 
the specific task constraints within which they act (for in- 
stance Kloos & van Orden, 2009; Meindertsma, van Dijk, 
Steenbeek, & van Geert, 2014). It is expected that these pro- 
perties and interactions strongly affect children’s perfor-
mance. For this reason, we study the temporal trajectories of 
the actual problem solving activities as they unfold in child- 
ren over the short-term time span of an actual problem 
solving situation and the long-term time span of eventual 
changes in the general pattern properties of the problem- 
solving activities, as suggested by Molenaar and Campbell 
(2009). This requires an observational, individual and time 
serial research design and corresponds to a microgenetic 
perspective.  
The microgenetic perspective is considered to be a  
process-oriented approach aimed at studying development 
and learning (Granott & Parziale, 2002). Microdevelop-
mental research focuses on the analysis of processes, which 
occur within specific task contexts, while people solve 
problems, perform tasks, or make discoveries. For instance, 
according to Miller and Coyle (1999) and Siegler, Adolph, 
and Lemaire (1996), researchers interested in micro-   
development analyze the process of change, identify its 
attributes and patterns, and look for the processes that  
underlie quantitative and qualitative change. This is in line 
with Thelen and Corbetta (2002) who stated that micro- 
development should be focused on the processes of change 
and not only on its endpoints.  
Microgenetic studies aim to track changes in children’s 
performance by measuring them at multiple points in time. 
These measurements reveal a pattern of change, and provide 
compelling descriptions of change processes of individuals 
(van Geert & van Dijk, 2002). From an idiographic point of 
view, the systematic description of single cases using a  
microgenetic approach can lead to generalized knowledge if 
an abstract model is built through the continuous abstraction 
of the main interactions, process and components of the 
system (Molenaar & Valsiner, 2009). 
Children’s inquiry: its nature and development 
As a result of organized and self-directed cognitive   
activities toward their environment, children can reach an 
early, relatively coherent and stable understanding of the 
world around them (e.g., Zimmerman, 2000; 2007). The 
general picture that emerges from the literature is that  
although this kind of activity is inherently self-directed, its 
nature and development is strongly dependent on specific, 
well-structured educational conditions and guidance. For 
instance, young children can achieve high levels of self- 
directed scientific reasoning, including the child's reflection 
on his or her own reasoning and explanatory activities but 
this occurs only under specific educational conditions 
(Metz, 2011). The literature on constructivist science 
learning, emphasizes the importance of the child's own  
activity and experiences in the construction of children's 
scientific knowledge and reasoning skills. In this sense, 
demonstrations of scientifically described phenomena are 
not enough to foster the development of scientific thinking. 
It is necessary that inquiry is driven by questions and  
problems that the children are motivated to answer and 
solve (Kuhn & Pease, 2008). Therefore, educational scaf-
folding of the self-directed process is of prime importance 
for the success of the developmental and learning outcomes   
(Alfieri, Brooks, Aldrich, & Tenenbaum, 2010; Gelman, 
2009; Klahr & Nigam, 2004; Lehrer, Schauble, & Lucas, 
2008; Mayer, 2004; Metz, 2011; Patrick, Mantzicopoulos, 
& Samarapungayan, 2009; Sarama & Clements, 2009).  
Inquiry is considered to be an important process that  
explains how cognitive structures and processes become 
actions (Puche-Navarro, 2005) and how they organize the 
activity to evaluate the hypothesis or its alternatives  
(Zimmerman, 2000). In this sense, inquiry can be aimed 
either at confirming or refuting the relevance of certain 
ideas or hypotheses related to the facts, or to validate crite-
ria for particular situations.  
There have been different approaches to the properties of 
scientific inquiry in young children. Some approaches em-
phasize the representational aspect of scientific inquiry, the 
"what" and the content; others focus on the strategic aspect, 
the "how", and still others focus on the motivational and 
interest aspects. In the first approach, we find notions such 
as beliefs, mental models, misconceptions, belief revision, 
mental model transformation and categorical and ontologi-
cal shifts in the basic features of a person's beliefs or 
knowledge about the nature of reality (see for instance Chi, 
& Brem, 2009; Hewson & Hewson, 1984; Tyson, Venville, 
Harrison, & Treagust, 1997; Vosniadou, 2009). In the sec-
ond type of approach we find notions such as causal rea-
soning (see for instance Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 2007; 
McClelland & Thompson, 2007), control of variables 
strategy (CVS; see for instance Chen & Klahr, 1999; 2008; 
Kuhn, 2007),  evidence evaluation and epistemic under-
standing (Chin & Brewer, 2001; Kuhn, Cheney, & Wein-
stock, 2000), and argumentation (e.g., Kuhn, 2010).  
When reviewing the literature, it stands out that most 
studies on inquiry treat the content and the strategic aspects 
of scientific reasoning would as independent variables that 
contribute to the short-term dependent variables ‘level of 
science reasoning’, ‘structure of inquiry’ and the long-term 
dependent variables ‘development of science reasoning and 
of inquiry’ in young children. For instance, Piekny and 
Mahler (2013) explored the development of scientific rea-
soning based on the Dual Search Model of Scientific rea-
soning (Klahr, 2000, 2005; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) across 
childhood. The authors demonstrated that the three general 




domain components, such as hypothesis generation, ex-
perimentation, and evidence evaluation, required by inquiry 
process developed asynchronously at different points in 
time. The literature also describes a global increase in in-
quiry skills (e.g., Piekny, Grube, Maehler, 2014; Tytler & 
Peterson, 2005). In general, many of these studies tended to 
focus on differences by age or by age-behavior-ability rela-
tionships between age groups (Puche-Navarro & Marti, 
2011), thus describing possible general developmental tra-
jectories of the children’s inquiry. However, a comparison 
between age groups or general longitudinal descriptions 
would only lead to a statistical model predicting group dis-
tributions of the dependent variable, and could not be con-
founded with a description of the process of ‘inquiry’ 
which focusses on intra-individual differences (for a gen-
eral account see Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). There is a 
lack of studies with longitudinal designs and/or many re-
peated measures, which could lead to a description of the 
long-term trajectories of developmental change as well as 
the short-term micro-developmental changes that take place 
on the time scale of real-time problem situations.  
 If a process of situated inquiry complies with the  
general properties of a complex dynamic system, it is likely 
that it also inherits other general properties of complex  
dynamic systems such as self-organization, the emergence 
of temporarily stable patterns, short-term processes and 
long-term transitions. Based on these ideas, we expect that 
the development of scientific reasoning in individuals will 
show non-linear patterns and specific patterns of variability. 
The patterns we expect would be similar to complex 
growth patterns such as scalloping as stated by Fischer 
(Fischer & Yan, 2002; Fischer & Bidell, 2006). Scalloping 
implies regressing back to a lower level of functioning 
when the person faces some change in the context or state 
of the problem he or she is solving. In addition, because the 
perceived task properties are intrinsic to the self-organizing 
process, performance is expected to be very context- and 
content-sensitive. 
In this person-oriented process study on problem-solving 
behavior in children, we asked ourselves the question: what 
does a real-time particular problem-solving process look 
like? By particular we mean: in particular children, for a 
particular occasion and with a particular type of question. It 
is a question of which do not know the answer yet. In the 
literature, it is very hard to find studies that describe the 
details of a particular problem-solving situation as a real- 
time process. Hence, a descriptive study of a particular 
problem-solving situation is therefore a first step towards a 
better understanding of the real-time nature of this type of 




This study aimed to describe the development of inquiry 
within a microgenetic research design, with a combination 
of short-term events within each problem-solving session 
and long-term event analysis over the course of six months. 
We focused on young children’s performance in problem 
solving situations that involve the comprehension of object 
movement systems in a computer-based task. We explored 
several dynamic aspects of inquiry, such as non-linearity, 
trail-by-trail and session-by-session variability, and context 
dependency.  
The research questions were: 
1. Is there an increase/growth in the problem-solving 
behavior over time in terms of inquiry functioning? 
If so, what pattern does it follow? 
2. Is there a changing pattern of variability in the  
inquiry functioning of the children on the   




Four pre-school children from the city of Cali, in the 
country of Colombia participated in this study. They     
belonged to medium-high socio-economical level families, 
based on the geographical location of where they lived in the 
city. The sample consisted of three boys we will refer to as 
Jerónimo, Samuel, and Juan (aged 5.2, 5,6 and 5.6), and a 
girl we will refer to as Mariana (aged 5.6 years) (the names 
are pseudonyms). All the children attended the same school 
and were in transition grade which is comparable to    
elementary school/ kindergarten in the US system. All the 
children had access to computers in their homes and schools 
and used them to play on a regular basis. They are also  
familiar with video games with a similar game play as used 





Children were repeatedly confronted with a computer 
game in which they had to manipulate three types of   
variables in order to figure out their influence on a physical 
system. The three problem-solving situations involved  
manipulating variables in order to reach a specific objective, 
which in each case was a ball reaching a target. The tasks 
involved the use of inclined planes to move a ball (task A), 
collision of an object with the ball (task B) and a catapult to 
throw the ball (task C). The tasks were similar in structure 
and implied the manipulation of three physical variables, 
changing the objects or positions involved in the problem on 
a screen with the computer keyboard. Two of the variables in 
each task had three possible values and the other one had 
two possible values. Changing the values of the variable 
allowed the children to modify the outcome distance. The 
children had to choose the value of the three variables in 
order to reach one of six possible targets in a plane with a 
ball. The targets were identified with different colors. 



















Figure 1. Frames from the actual digital tasks (task A, B and C) (2-column). 
 
 
Table 1  
Variable values for the tasks 
Inclined planes  Collision  Catapult 




















1 Long 1  High 90 1  High Long 1 
2 Short 2  Medium 45 2  Medium Short 2 
3  3  Low  3  Low  3 
 
 
The tasks were (See Figure 1 and Table 1):  
(A) Inclined Planes. For this task, children must      
manipulate the height of the ramp, the type of ball and the 
length it has to travel over the ramp in order to achieve the 
required distance. 
(B) Collision. In this task, the children must use a mobile 
impulse generator (a baseball bat, a racket, or a golf club) in 
two different possible angles in order to push one of three 
different balls to a certain point on the horizontal scale. 
(C) Parabolic Movement. In this task, the children must 
manipulate a catapult device, setting three different possible 
projectiles, with three different possible counterweights, in 
two different possible positions in order to throw the three 




After receiving approval from their caregivers, the  
children were tested 12 times (intervals of roughly 2 weeks 
among sessions during a period of five months and thirty 
days). The children completed one task per session, and 
they faced each task four times. The tasks were presented in 
the same order for the four children (A, B, C, A, B, C and 
so on). None of the participants had previously received 
information on the content of the tasks. For all tasks and in 
each session a familiarization story was presented and the 
children were allowed to freely manipulate the elements of 
the tasks. This condition was intended to give the     
researcher assurance about the children's understanding of 
the assignment and their comprehension of the variables 
involved in the construction of each of the three tasks. 
During the experiment, an experimenter was always present, 
introducing the task and setting the targets. The experi-
menter did not interfere or help the children to reach the 
targets. The tasks took place in the children’s homes in a 
separated room. For every task the children had to reach 6 
different distances to the target, and were given a maximum 
number of 10 attempts to reach each target. Here, ‘attempt’ 
refers to every time the child set the values of the variables 
in the movement system and threw the object to try reach a 
target. After the children reached the target or after 10  
attempts were made for each target, the next target was 
presented. The order in which the target distances were 
presented was determined by the combinations of variable 
values that were needed to reach the target. This order was 
counter-balanced among sessions. 
The data were collected using software that registered 
the setting of the system for every attempt. This software 
was developed in the programming language Python and 
the database was designed using PostgreSQL. Each attempt 
was scored during a coding session using an Excel work-
sheet programmed to score the attempts in terms of the 
levels of performance.







Levels of inquiry functioning that describe the performance on each individual attempt 








1 Reiteration of magnitudes between attempts 
(Repeating same conditions from last attempt) 
No 
 
No No No 
2 Basic adjustment without magnitude coordi-
nation nor previous information coordination.  
No No No No 
3 Basic adjustment with magnitude but without 
coordination with previous information coor-
dination. 
No Yes No No 
4 Basic adjustment isolating variables but with-
out previous information coordination. 
No Yes Yes No 
5 Adjustments without magnitude coordination 
but coordinated with previous information. 
Yes No Yes No 
6 Adjustment with multiple variables with  
magnitude and previous information coordina-
tion and partially attuned with the goal. 
Yes Yes No No 
7 Systematic adjustment isolating variables and 
with previous information coordination and 
partially attuned with the goal. 
Yes Yes Yes No 
8 Adjustments with multiple variables and with 
magnitude and previous feedback coordina-
tion attuned with the goal. 
Yes Yes No Yes 
9 Adjustment with variable isolation and with 
previous information coordination. Goal 
reached. 






In this study, we focused on two measures as indicators 
of the performance in each session. These were: 1) levels of 
inquiry, and 2) error index. With regard to the first measure, 
the child’s performance was scored based on the adjust-
ments made by the children on the moving object in order 
to reach a target. Every attempt (every time the child speci-
fies the values of the variables in the movement system and 
throws the object to reach a target) was scored on a 9-point 
scale, and this score was established on the basis of the 
changes the child made in comparison to the previous at- 
tempt (changes in the choices of the values). This scale de- 
scribed how systematic the child’s attempt to change the 
previous outcome was. It considers whether the child simp- 
ly repeats the previous attempt, makes counter-productive 
adjustments, or makes well-organized controlled changes in 
the values. For every attempt, four dimensions were con-
sidered: the use of the task feedback, variable coordination, 
variable isolation and success reaching the target.  
The use of task feedback refers to making changes   
related to the distance reached versus target distance. The 
use of task feedback is the case when a child reduces the 
distance reached when he or she observed to have over-
passed on the previous attempt or when he or she increases 
the distance after falling short on the previous attempt. 
Variable coordination implies the synchronization of the 
direction of the adjustments. For example, if one variable is 
increased in its value and another one is decreased, this 
would cancel out the net result, which would be not be  
coordination of variables. On the other hand, if all the se- 
lected variables are either increased or decreased, there 
would be variable coordination. Variable isolation refers to 
the use of the minimum number of possible variables. 
When a child concentrates on only one or two variables, he 
or she is having more control over the task through variable 
isolation. Finally, reaching the target or not was also taken 
in consideration to determine each level, because this was 
the goal of the game. See Table 2 for a description of the 
resulting inquiry levels. All inquiry levels were automati-
cally generated within the software of the game. 
In order to understand the application of the inquiry  
levels, consider the following example. In the first attempt, 
the moving object did not reach the target but moved   
beyond it. In the second attempt, the child made an adjust-
ment with two variables (ball –1; angle +1) (no variable 
isolation). He did not coordinate the magnitude of these 
adjustments (no variable coordination), and did not coordi-




nate his procedures using previous information in order to 
reduce the distance previously reached (no task feedback). 
The result is still overpassing the target. This attempt was 
scored at level 2 according to Table 2. In a third attempt, 
the child coordinated previous information by reducing the 
distance (task feedback) and isolating only one variable 
(ball -2) (variable isolation), also coordinating the magni-
tude of his adjustment (variable coordination). However, 
the ball overpassed the target. This attempt was scored at 
level 7 accordingly.  
The second measure in the analysis was the ‘error index’, 
which was computed as the sum of absolute distances  
between the target and the result achieved for all attempts 
on the same target. There were 6 error indexes per session 
and 72 for the whole series of repeated tasks. Consider the 
following example: imagine that for the first attempt, the 
target was located at a distance of 5, and the moving object 
reached a distance of 3, leading to a difference of 2. For the 
second attempt, the target was still 5 and the result was 4, 
which results in an absolute difference of 1. For the third 
attempt the child reached the target (the difference was 0). 
The total error index for this target would be calculated as 
the sum of the absolute differences, which in this case 
would be equal to 3 (2+1+0). The error index was also  
automatically generated by an algorithm within the data-
base. 
Each target could be reached by specific combinations of 
values from the three variables. However, the number of 
unique combination was not the same for each target   
position. In total, there were eighteen combinations of  
values (3*3*2). Targets 3 and 4 were reached for five of 
these combinations (each), targets 2 and 5 were reached for 
three of these combinations (each), and targets 1 and 6 were 
reached with one unique combination (each). This means 
that if a child selects a random combination of values, he or 
she has a high probability of reaching target 3 and 4  
(roughly .28 each), a lower probability of reaching targets 2 
and 5 (roughly .17 each), and very low probability of 
reaching targets 1 and 6 (roughly .06 each). However, since 
all positions were offered in each session (in the same  
order), we do not expect this to influence the sessions  
performance or the developmental trajectories of the   
performance over time.   
The analyses were predominantly based on the descrip-
tion of individual developmental trajectories. First, in order 
to answer RQ1, the average inquiry level for every session 
was presented showing general trajectories. These were  
followed by the raw data, plotted in combination with  
Loess smoothing, in order to capture the local tendencies 
and to obtain an impression of the local variability at the 
same time. Note that in those series that contained less than 
15 data points, a moving average with a window of three 
data points was used instead of a Loess smoothing. After 
this, the error index trajectories are described, in combina-
tion with their pattern of intra-individual variability, in  
order to answer RQ2. For this purpose, we use a so-called 
minmax graph: a graphical representation of the lower and 
upper extremes in the data that uses a moving window (for 
a more elaborate description, see van Geert & van Dijk, 
2002).  
Finally, in order to answer RQ3 and test task differences, 
a Monte Carlo analysis was performed on the individual 
time series. The analysis was based on a random permuta-
tion technique, which is a statistical procedure based on 
estimating probabilities by randomly drawing samples from 
a dataset based on the null hypothesis, and comparing the 
empirically found values with the result from a resampling 
procedure. If the probability of finding the observed value 
in the resampling procedure is very low (in this case below 
5%), the result is considered to differ significantly from the 
null hypothesis model. The analysis was performed in 
Poptools (Hood, 2004; also see Todman & Dugard, 2001).  
In the current data, the Monte Carlo procedure was used 
to test whether there was a difference in difficulty of the six 
possible target positions. We did this by comparing the sum 
of all error indices of the different positions and the mean of 
the inquiry level for each position. It is important to note that 
this analysis was based on the null hypothesis that there was 
a symmetrical distribution in the difficulty of the six posi-
tions. This null hypothesis is solely based on the a-priori 
chances of reaching the target with a random combination of 
values at the three variables. Under this null hypothesis, 
position 3 and 4 were equally difficult (a priori chance of 
reaching the target was roughly 0.28 each, because for each 
of these targets 5 out of 18 combinations lead to reaching 
this result). The same applied for positions 2 and 5 (a priori 
chance was 0.17, because 3 out of 18 combination lead to 
reaching this target) and 1 and 6 (a priori chance was 0.06, 
because 1 out of 18 combinations lead to reaching this  
target). Following this assumption, we computed the ratio of 
the performance at position 1 over 6, 2 over 5, and 3 over 4 
(1 divided by 6, 2 divided by 5, and 3 divided by 4). If these 
ratios were equal or close to 1, the performance was roughly 
symmetrical. For error index, values smaller than 1 suggest 
better performance closer to the starting position of the ball 
(fewer errors), whereas for the mean inquiry level, values 
below 1 suggest worse performance for positions closer to 
the starting position (higher inquiry levels). If the values 
differed significantly from 1, it was asymmetric. In the 
Monte Carlo analysis, we reshuffled the data without   
replacement across positions and compared the results of 
this with the empirical error indices of the six positions. 
After reshuffling the data 5000 times we calculated the 
frequency that the empirical values were replicated by the 
resampled data and transformed this into a p-value.
 
 


















Three out of four children showed a general increase in 
the mean inquiry level per session in combination with a 
slight oscillatory pattern (see Figure 2). There were several 
relapses that indicated individual and inter-task differences, 
for example, Mariana’s decline in the last session with task 
A, Jerónimo’s irregular performance in task B at the 8th 
session, Juan’s marked decrease for the 11th and 12th   
sessions. In general, the three children’s trajectories seem to 
be quite similar when describing averages per session. In 
contrast, Samuel’s mean does not show a general increase 







sessions.   
Figures 3 to 6 show the general trajectories of the raw 
data and a Loess trend line of the real-time inquiry levels of 
the four individual children across the entire measurement 
period. Each figure shows a combination of graphs, one 
graph for each session in which the performance (inquiry 
level) for each of the child’s attempts is depicted. Visual 
inspection shows a large degree of variability between the 
individual attempts within and across all sessions. Recall 
that ‘attempt’ refers to every time the child set the values of 
the variables in the movement system and threw the object 
to try reach a target. Depending on the performance of the 
child, the number of attempts could be different (a new 
target was presented after the child either reached the target 
or after 10 attempts maximum, which implies that a session 
can be between 6 and 60 attempts long). Some sessions 
seem to show a global increase in performance (for    
instance, Mariana’s 3rd and Jerónimo’s 1st session) but  
others do not. Although there is a global reduction of low 
level inquiry over the sessions, it is remarkable that all 
children show some attempts with a low inquiry level even 
in the final sessions.  
Though some global similarities in the mean inquiry  
levels per session exist (see Figure 2), we observed a lot of 
variability when zooming in at a microscopic time scale 
(Figures 3 to 6). Overall, a general pattern of variability can 
be described in terms of a tendency of the trajectories to 
concentrate in higher levels, but also with low levels of 
performance which remain to be part of the children’s  
behavioral repertoire.  
Some general patterns can also be observed when    
inspecting the development of the error index. For both 
Mariana and Jerónimo (see Figure 7), a clear decrease in 
the general level and variability range can be identified 
after sessions 4 and 5. For Juan, there is also a clear reduc-
tion of variability, but the bandwidth of performance   
remains to be larger than the other two children.  
 













































        
 
Figure 3. General trajectories of the inquiry level for each attempt within each session (Mariana). 
 
 




























































































         
Figure 5. General trajectories of the inquiry level for each attempt within each session (Juan) 
  














































Figure 6. General trajectories of the inquiry level for each attempt within each session (Samuel). 
  





















































Figure 7. Variability range of the error index for each target, for all sessions. 




For Samuel’s error index trajectory, no clear trend can be 
described. The variability remained large for the entire  
trajectory with peaks and valleys on his performance all 
along the trajectory. In summary, these results showed that 
three out of four children showed a decrease in the varia- 
bility of the error index, indicating that their performance 
became more regulated and stable. However, in all children, 
smaller or larger bursts of variability remained present 
along the entire trajectory.  
 
Relation between target position and performance 
 
 When considering the performance for the different 
target positions, in three out of four children (Samuel, Juan, 
and Jerónimo) the distribution of errors was clearly skewed 
(i.e., the performance for position 6 was generally better 
than for position 1). This was surprising, since, given the 
task structure, a symmetrical distribution was expected. In 
Mariana’s case the distribution was generally more   
symmetrical. We tested this observation with a Monte Carlo 
analysis by taking the ratio of the ‘mirror targets’ as a crite-
rion (performance on target 1divided by target 6, and 2 by 5 
and 3 by 4 respectively). The results (see table 3) showed 
that for error index, three children (Juan, Jerónimo and 
Samuel) showed a significant difference between position 1 
and 6 and only for Jerónimo between 3 and 4 (position 3 
being less optimal than 4). For the inquiry level average, 
two children (Samuel and Juan) showed a significant   
difference between position 1 and 6, one child between 2 
and 5 (Jerónimo) and one between position 3 and 4  
(Samuel). It is noteworthy that in all these significant cases 
the targets that were on the on the “left tail” of the task (that 
is far from the ramp, bat, catapult) were consistently   
performed better (fewer errors and higher inquiry level) 





Results of the Monte Carlo analyses concerning the differences between target positions using mean inquiry levels 
and error index (p-values between parentheses) 
   Inquiry level  Error index 





































































Note: The ratio was calculated as the value at position 1, 2, and 3 (respectively) divided by the value at position 6, 5, and 4 re-
spectively. 
 





When overall trajectories were considered, two promi-
nent observations stood out. First, when we look at each 
session’s average performance a robust trend towards a 
higher performance was observed in three out of four  
participating children. Patterns varied from a stepwise or 
global increase as were seen in Mariana and Jerónimo, to 
oscillating trajectories characterized by relapses as seen in 
Juan and Samuel. Secondly, there was a great degree of 
variability in the performance of the four children. Children 
clearly did not gradually improve their problem-solving 
performance across time but showed large moment- 
to-moment fluctuations, even after many repeated admini- 
strations of the same task. This means that after repeated 
exposure to the same problem-solving task, children tended 
to regulate their strategies maintaining a high degree of   
exploration, whereas at the same time, they had a tendency 
to show an increase in their efficiency in arriving at the 
solution. This phenomenon could be related to the emer-
gence of new forms of cognitive functioning throughout the 
inquiry process. The findings indicated that the develop-
ment of inquiry in this task does not follow a linear growth 
but includes advances and relapses, exploratory states and 
transitions. It is characterized by a high degree of perfor-
mance variability – which was most prominent shortly after 
the task introduction and showed a reduction over time- 
and individual differences.  
The observed real-time variability can be understood as 
an expression of the flexibility required for the system to 
change over time and to find new and more stable forms of 
organization. In addition, the presence of variability   
suggests a coexistence of basic and advanced forms of  
reasoning during the unfolding of the process. This is also 
observed in a process called ‘scalloping’ as described by 
Fischer (Fischer & Yan, 2002; Fischer & Bidell, 2006), 
where a learner regresses back to a lower level of function-
ing when he or she faces some change in the context. The 
combination of simultaneous low-level and high-level 
functioning allows the flexibility that is required to attain 
the kind of complex and recursive cognitive functioning   
demanded by inquiry. This fragility does not allow the  
inquiry functioning to be easily generalized across tasks, 
and minor changes in the situation itself cause the system to 
fall to lower levels and to constantly reconstruct itself 
(Fischer & Bidell, 2006). This phenomenon follows the 
idea of Kloos and van Orden (2009) regarding the strong 
context dependence of the cognitive activity and its ‘soft 
assembly’ nature.  
In addition, when we examined the within-task differ-
ences, there was a clear asymmetry in performance sug-
gesting that children perceive the targets differently. In five 
out of eight comparisons, the performance on position 1 
was significantly worse than in position 6. Though the 
same trend was visible between other target comparisons, 
the results were less robust. However, in all cases, the  
targets that were on the far end of the start position had a 
better performance (fewer errors, higher inquiry levels) 
than targets that were closer to the starting position. It 
should be noted that the analysis was based on a-priori 
chances of reaching the target based on a random combina-
tion of values. Of course children do not adjust the values 
on a random basis but do this purposely, as the other results 
have already indicated. There is no intrinsic reason in the 
game why targets closer to the base would be more difficult 
than targets on the far end, though the performance indi-
cates that they are. However, the results show that in many 
cases the performance was worse for targets closer to the 
base and that the null hypothesis was rejected. This trend 
was also corroborated by the observations during the task 
administration that some children often responded as being 
more ‘worried’ when presented with target 1, for instance 
by saying “no, not the difficult one again!”. A possible  
explanation might be that the task demanded a high inhibi-
tion load on the children, something they had difficulty 
coping with. It is possible that the children anticipated  
target 1 as harder to reach because of a perceived demand 
of being ‘extra cautious’ about passing over the target.  
Instead, target 6 could be perceived as a ‘get as far as you 
can’ goal.  
This observation coincides with Thelen and Smith’s 
(1994) view that cognitive processing emerges in the form 
of context-embedded perception-action loops, and that they 
are in that sense soft-assembled and intrinsically variable 
(see also Bickhard, 2009, 2012). The presence of variability 
does not necessarily imply self-organizing dynamics   
operating along the developmental trajectories. An alterna-
tive explanation could have to do with lack of consolidation 
of a general domain component, such as hypothesis gene- 
ration, experimentation, and evidence evaluation (Piekny & 
Mahler, 2013). These would arise in a stable form at   
different moments of development, acting as the mecha-
nism that generates the observed behavior of the child. On 
the other hand, a dynamic system approach could prove to 
be a plausible alternative to explain the emergent and 
soft-assembled nature of these processes. This kind of  
description is compatible with the non-linear development 
we observed. Also, the soft-assembled nature of inquiry 
revealed by the fragility of the performance could account 
for the coexistence of its components with a probabilistic 
nature within the children’s performance.  
It is important to note that inquiry also has a clear social 
component, which should be included in further research. 
Several studies have focused on the influence of a support-
ing adult on the performance of the child during a scientific 
task (e.g. Peterson, & French, 2008; Rappolt-Schlichtmann, 
Tenenbaum, Koepke, & Fischer, 2007). However, in the 
present study, we have limited ourselves to problem solving 
in a self-regulatory context, that is, the emergence of  
problem solving in the sole interaction between a child and 
a task. Although self-regulation is an extensive topic in 




itself that exceeds the scope of this paper, it should be noted 
that several authors (such as Boekaerts & Cascallar, 2006) 
have pointed at emergent aspects of self-regulation.  
The results of this study are based on a multiple case 
study of four individuals. It may be argued that further 
study is needed aimed at collecting a more extensive data-
base of subjects that allows for the comparison between a 
larger set of (types) of trajectories. However, this does not 
mean that the study of a small set of individuals by defini-
tion leads to limited knowledge. Maybe it could be argued 
that only knowledge about universals, that is, universal 
processes of problem-solving in children, is valid scientific 
knowledge, and knowledge about particular individuals is 
less scientifically valid. However, if scientific research is a 
way of answering questions about things we still do not 
know, then the detailed study of a particular problem-  
solving process, is also a valid scientific activity, based on a 
valid scientific question. If it were indeed so that we knew 
already a lot about how particular problem-solving pro-
cesses in young children look like, how they evolve over 
time and so forth, then doing yet another detailed analysis 
of a particular problem-solving process would probably add 
very little to our scientific knowledge, unless this study 
were aimed at answering questions that resulted from the 
previous person oriented studies. However, the point is that 
we know very little about the particulars and the detailed 
time-dependent structure of children’s problem solving 
behavior when repeatedly faced with a task situation. 
The question may be asked as to whether the knowledge 
about a few particular cases is generalizable. The answer to 
this question depends on the definition of generalizability. 
In the standard account, generalizability is a statistical 
property of a particular finding based on a sample of inde-
pendent cases, which basically amounts to the probability 
that the finding is true (or within which limits it is true) of 
another sample of independent cases that represent the 
same general category, namely the set of all possible cases 
representing that category (which is customarily called the 
population). The category in question can be any general 
natural category, for instance the category of 5-year-old 
children, or it can be any combination of such general  
natural categories for instance the combination of the cate-
gory of 5-year-old children with the category of physics   
problems. In a person-oriented account, generalization it-
self is a process, rather than a given statistical property of 
the finding based on a particular sample. Generalization is a 
process of belief revision, based on existing and newly  
acquired evidence. It is part of an epistemic process going 
both ways, namely the way of particularization (answering 
the question of how a general model of certain phenomena 
and processes works out if it is carried out on the level of 
actual, real-time, particular processes) and the way of  
generalization (answering the question of how a model 
based on particulars works out of it is linked with general 
theoretical principles and empirical findings on other  
particulars). Generalization in the case of a few specific 
person-oriented process studies begins with trying to estab-
lish the differences and similarities between the cases, and 
trying to connect the findings with general theoretical  
principles (such as those regarding the importance of varia-
bility, self-organization etc.).  
In person-oriented research, generalization is often not 
an immediate result of a single study, but is very often a 
long and very tedious process that requires chains of con-
nected studies. Hence, the question to be answered is not so 
much whether the findings generalize, for example to the 
general population of a particular category, or to other tasks 
or general classes of tasks, but rather whether a particular 
empirical study makes a relevant contribution to the long 
and laborious process of generalization, and if so, what is  
contribution might be.  
In the current study, we have tried to make a contribution 
towards understanding inquiry functioning and its devel-
opment in children, by providing a detailed description of 
the temporal unfolding of such processes on the short-term 
time scale of the child's actual solving of the problems and 
the long-term time scale of learning and development, 
which in this particular study covered the changes occur-
ring over a period of five months. We believe that such 
detailed process descriptions are the necessary first steps 
towards a better understanding of the complex dynamic 
nature of inquiry processes in young children. 
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